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 Management of Toxins in the Environment
 (E. Jane Luzar, Louisiana State University, presiding)
 The Political Economics of California's
 Proposition 65
 Tim T. Phipps, Kristen Allen, and Julie A. Caswell
 California is notorious for supplying the coun-
 try with presidents, fruits, nuts, and vegeta-
 bles, and propositions with numbers like 13,
 65, or 103 that are either proclaimed as por-
 tending the policy wave of the future or the
 end of life as we know it. Proposition 65,
 which led to the Safe Drinking Water and
 Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, continues
 that tradition.
 Proposition 65, or the act, is really two
 pieces of legislation with some interesting
 twists on legal standing and burden of proof.
 The pieces are a required warning prior to
 public exposure to certain carcinogens and re-
 productive toxins, and a prohibition against
 knowingly endangering drinking water by dis-
 charging such chemicals. In this paper we re-
 view the act, discuss implementation, analyze
 the warning and water discharge provisions,
 and discuss the relation between federal and
 state authority in regulating health risk from
 toxic chemicals.
 The 1980s have seen a rising concern about
 hazardous chemicals in the environment. In
 1986 the time was ripe in California for activist
 groups to take action against the perceived
 failure of state and federal regulators to pro-
 tect the public from chemical hazards. The
 Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the
 Sierra Club designed a controversial initiative
 known as Proposition 65. The initiative re-
 ceived strong support from consumer and en-
 vironmentalist groups and vociferous opposi-
 tion from industry. Proposition 65 passed by a
 wide margin, 63% to 37%, in November 1986.
 While Proposition 65 will probably bring
 about neither the demise of California busi-
 ness nor everlasting health, it will change the
 way people do business in California and
 could signal a nationwide trend. Several other
 states, including Massachusetts, New York,
 Hawaii, and Maine have considered similar
 legislation. Nor is its impact limited to
 states-in November 1989 a federal warning
 will be required on alcoholic beverages alert-
 ing drinkers to the dangers of fetal alcohol
 syndrome and driving while intoxicated.
 The Scientific Advisory Panel and the "List"
 The California State Health and Welfare
 Agency (HWA), with support from several
 other state agencies, has primary responsibil-
 ity for implementation. In February 1987,
 Governor Deukmejian set up a twelve-
 member scientific panel to advise the state and
 announced the first list of 26 carcinogens and 3
 reproductive toxins. The panel has drawn
 from the lists of other groups such as the
 International Agency for Research on Cancer
 (Kizer et al.). By July 1989, the list had grown
 to 261 carcinogens and 35 reproductive toxins,
 with an additional 26 carcinogens to be con-
 sidered in October 1989.' Once chemicals are
 on the list they are referred to as being
 "known by the state to cause cause cancer or
 reproductive toxicity" and become subject to
 the warning requirement and discharge prohi-
 bition.
 The Warning Requirement
 "No person in the course of doing business
 shall knowingly and intentionally expose any
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 individual to a (listed chemical) without first
 giving clear and reasonable warning to such
 individual,..." (California Health and Safety
 Code (HSC) S. 25249.6). Perhaps the most
 visible provision of the act, the warning re-
 quirement, puts businesses on notice that the
 California public must be informed when they
 are exposed to a "significant risk" of cancer
 from a listed chemical or if the chemical would
 cause an "observable (reproductive) effect"
 at levels "one thousand times the level in
 question." The warning requirement becomes
 effective twelve months after a chemical is
 listed and is required at the point of exposure.
 The Discharge Prohibition
 "No person in the course of doing business
 shall knowingly discharge a (listed chemical)
 into water or onto land where such chemical
 passes or probably will pass into any source of
 drinking water, .. ." (HSC S. 25249.5). The
 discharge provision prohibits the discharge of
 listed chemicals into sources or potential
 sources of drinking water unless it will not
 result in a "significant amount" of the chemi-
 cal entering drinking water and the discharge
 is in "conformity with all other laws and with
 every applicable regulation, permit, require-
 ment and order (HSC S. 25249.9)." A sig-
 nificant amount is defined to be "any detect-
 able amount," unless the level would pose no
 "significant risk" from cancer, or will cause
 no observable reproductive effects at levels
 "one thousand times the level in question."
 The discharge prohibition goes into effect
 twenty months after a chemical is listed.
 Enforcement
 The most innovative and controversial fea-
 tures of Proposition 65 are its enforcement
 provisions. The act provides civil penalties of
 up to $2,500 per violation per day for busi-
 nesses that knowingly violate either the warn-
 ing or discharge provisions. Enforcement is
 encouraged by the so-called bounty hunter
 provision which gives legal standing to any
 California citizen, whether the citizen was the
 harmed party or not, to bring suit. The citizen
 is required only to give the Attorney General
 (or district attorney) the option to press the
 case and to wait 60 days to see if public action
 is taken. The eventual prosecutor, whether
 public attorney or private citizen, is entitled to
 25% of the pro eeds from a successful lawsuit.
 The act lso encourages enforcement by in-
 verting the burden of proof. Once a chemical
 is listed, the us r must either prove that its use
 is safe or comply with the act. Avoiding the
 warning requir s proof that the level of expo-
 sure to a carcinogen poses no significant risk,
 or that exposure to levels 1,000 times greater
 would not produce an observable reproductive
 effect. For water discharge the law effectively
 prohibits use of a listed chemical if a detect-
 able amount will reach water, unless the user
 can prove the level meets the warning exemp-
 tion.
 The bounty hunter provision and inverted
 burden of proof act to decentralize or privatize
 enforcement.
 Implementation
 While industry continues to fight Proposition
 65-there have been several constitutional
 challenges and attempts to invoke federal
 preemption-implementation has softened
 many of the potential effects on agriculture
 and industry. To begin with, the act applies
 only to firms employing more than ten em-
 ployees and exempts federal, state, and local
 agencies and, ironically, public water utilities.
 Second, the act is terse and contains a number
 of undefined terms.
 An early task of the HWA was defining
 "significant risk" for cancer. They settled on
 anything greater than one excess cancer in
 100,000. This is one order of magnitude more
 lenient than the 10-6 rule of thumb commonly
 used at EPA and the FDA. However, the rule
 makers were not given any latitude to interpret
 significant risk from reproductive toxins. The
 limit for reproductive toxins was specified in
 the act and as discussed above is quite strin-
 g t. The reproductive toxin tolerance level is
 o stringent that it could require warning
 labels for products containing minute quan-
 tities of alcohol, such as orange juice and van-
 illa ice cream (Russell).
 The HWA has attempted to give businesses
 a compliance target by setting acceptable
 standards for some listed chemicals. As of
 March 1989, fifty standards had been set and
 more are being developed. HWA has also
 temporarily adopted FDA standards for car-
 cinogens and reproductive toxins in food,
 drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices. If fu-
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 ture risk assessment results in the HWA set-
 ting stricter tolerances than FDA, the Califor-
 nia standard will prevail.
 The HWA has allowed food retailers to
 meet the warning requirement with a toll free
 number consumers can call to find out if a
 certain product contains a listed chemical.
 Warning labels have been required for tobacco
 products not covered by federal regulations,
 for reproductive risks from alcohol, and for
 environmental and workplace risks.
 Performance
 It is too early to evaluate the performance of
 the discharge prohibition because it only went
 into effect in October 1988 and does not apply
 to a particular chemical until twenty months
 after it is placed on the list. The warning re-
 quirement, however, has been in effect for
 some chemicals since early 1988. Despite
 claims by opponents that it would lead to a
 flood of law suits, only seven suits have been
 brought to date.
 One suit, brought unsuccessfully by the
 Grocery Manufacturers Association, charged
 that Proposition 65 was an unconstitutional
 impediment to interstate commerce. Another
 suit, brought by the California Attorney Gen-
 eral and EDF, charged that the toll free
 number constituted insufficient warning for
 non-cigarette tobacco products. The case was
 settled when the tobacco manufacturers
 agreed to label their products and pay
 $37,500 each to the Attorney General and
 EDF (Carrick).
 Analysis
 We will analyze Proposition 65 from two
 perspectives. The first involves the politics of
 risk management. The second, on which we
 will spend more time, is the economics of risk
 management.
 It is relatively easy to criticize Proposition
 65 on economic efficiency grounds. To
 critique the act purely in efficiency terms,
 however, does not do justice to the act or the
 two-thirds of California's voters who sup-
 ported it. Proposition 65 must be viewed as an
 attempt to reform the way we manage the risk
 from toxic chemicals in the United States.
 The preamble to the act indicates that sup-
 porters of the initiative felt that the public
 needed protection from toxic materials in food
 and the environment, and that the regulatory
 process had failed to provide that protection.2
 The causes of that perceived failure include
 the slowness of the regulatory process in as-
 sessing the risk from toxic chemicals and re-
 moving them from the market and a loss of
 public confidence in the ability and willingness
 f regulators to protect consumers.
 These concerns are dealt with in several
 inn vative ways by Proposition 65. The first
 involves the scientific panel and the list. The
 list is designed to end the seemingly endless
 regulatory debates about whether a chemical
 should or should not be banned. Once the
 panel puts a chemical on the list, the debate is
 over-it is "known" by the state of California
 to cause cancer or birth defects. Second,
 the regulatory process is expedited both by
 privatizing decisions about whether a chemi-
 cal should be withdrawn from the market or
 left in the market with a warning label attached
 and by decentralizing enforcement.3 Industry
 has economic incentives to cease using listed
 chemicals to avoid the direct and indirect
 costs of the warning requirement or the threat
 of fines for water discharge.4
 Enforcement was decentralized by giving
 any citizen in the state legal standing to bring
 suit. By itself, legal standing would not have
 worked. High transactions costs are asso-
 ciated with bringing suits, and most citizens do
 not have the equipment or expertise to detect
 listed chemicals and to prove that exposure
 constituted a significant risk. Proposition 65
 dealt with the high costs of bringing suits with
 the bounty hunter provision. The need for test-
 ing equipment and sophisticated risk assess-
 ment was dealt with by inverting the burden of
 proof.
 Proposition 65, then, has strengthened toxic
 chemical policy in California in a manner that
 transfers most of the costs of and responsibil-
 ity for risk management from the regulatory
 system to producers, consumers, and the
 courts. Whether or not the instruments-the
 warning and discharge provisions-are eco-
 nomically efficient is explored below.
 2 The preamble to the act states, "The citizens of California find
 that hazardous chemicals pose a serious threat to their health and
 well being, (and) that state government agencies have failed to
 provide them with adequate protection, .. ." (HSC S. 25249.5).
 3 Privatized decision making only applies to chemicals that ap-
 pear on the list but are not already banned by other regulatory
 authority. Numerous banned chemicals, such as DDT, also appear
 on the list.
 4 The writers of Proposition 65 have stated that the purpose of
 the warning requirement is to encourage industry to stop using the
 listed chemicals.
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 Economic Efficiency
 The policy instruments chosen by Proposition
 65 could improve the efficiency of risk man-
 agement if they replace a current regulation at
 lower cost or if they correct a market or gov-
 ernment failure not addressed by current regu-
 lations, and the benefits of correction exceed
 the costs.
 The warning requirement does not meet the
 first criterion because it does not replace regu-
 lation with warnings. It superimposes the
 warnings onto the regulatory system. It may,
 however, meet the second criterion.
 The warning requirement may address an
 information market failure. To see how, it is
 useful to review a paper by Darby and Karni.
 Darby and Karni present three qualities of
 consumer goods: search, experience, and cre-
 dence. Search qualities may be determined
 prior to purchase; experience qualities may be
 determined only through use; and credence
 qualities are not determined by the consumer
 even after purchase and use. A consumer must
 rely on expert opinion to discern credence
 qualities. Examples used by Darby and Karni
 are the purchase of automotive services and
 health care. Chronic health risk from ingesting
 small quantities of toxic chemicals can also be
 viewed as a credence quality. Ingesting a par-
 ticular toxic material combines in a highly
 stochastic fashion with other factors such as
 ingestion of or environmental exposure to
 other toxins, lifestyle, and genetic predisposi-
 tion to produce chronic illnesses such as
 cancer.
 Because the uninformed consumer cannot
 detect credence qualities, there may be a role
 for warnings or public provision of informa-
 tion. This role depends on the benefits and
 costs of intervention and whether or not pri-
 vate markets in information would arise in the
 absence of intervention.
 To generate health benefits, the warning re-
 quirement must provide information not al-
 ready available. It must also lead risk-averse
 consumers to shift consumption away from
 foods or activities with high probability risks,
 toward foods and activities with lower risks.
 Unfortunately, the form of the warning may
 prevent it from generating these benefits.
 The particular warning recommended in the
 regulations is not informative about actual or
 relative health risks. For consumers to reduce
 dietary health risk, they need not only infor-
 mation about the risks from toxic chemicals in
 a particular food, they also need to know the
 health benefits of that food and the risks and
 benefits of alternative . There is a consider-
 able risk that the warning requirements will
 cause consumers to avoid consumption of
 foods cont ining listed chemicals but that con-
 stitute a small overall health risk while at the
 same time increasing consumption of alterna-
 tive foods that have a higher overall level of
 ealth risk but are exempt from the warning.
 An example of the latter is foods that are high
 in saturated fats but contain no listed chemi-
 cals. The use of strong warnings for small risks
 may also reduce the effectiveness of warnings
 for high probability risks (Viscusi). As argued
 frequently by scientific panel member Bruce
 Ames, a society concerned with reducing
 overall health risk is foolish to ignore large-
 scale risks such as smoking or driving while
 intoxicated while spending considerable sums
 to avoid risks that are several orders of mag-
 nitude lower.
 The warning requirement will, however,
 generate real costs. The costs will be borne by
 taxpayers, industry, and consumers. Tax-
 payer costs include administrative costs and
 uncompensated court costs. Industry costs in-
 clude costs of testing and labeling, costs of lost
 sales from reduced consumption of a labeled
 product or withdrawal of a product to avoid
 the warning, and increased production costs
 from altering technology to eliminate the listed
 chemical. Consumer costs include higher
 prices as producers pass some of their costs to
 the consumer, and losses in consumer surplus
 from consumers who would prefer cheaper
 food with a higher health risk and from re-
 duced product availability in California as
 some products are withdrawn.
 Finally, it is important to ask whether or not
 a free market will respond to the public's de-
 mand for safety in the absence of regulation. It
 seems unrealistic to expect industry voluntar-
 ily to supply warnings about workplace and
 environmental exposure to toxic chemicals un-
 less the warnings reduce the expected costs of
 future liability suits. With food risk, however,
 the story may be different. If consumers will
 pay more for foods that are certified to be free
 of certain chemicals, under certain conditions
 we would expect markets to evolve to supply
 those foods. The conditions are that the costs
 of supplying the "safe" food, which include
 testing, higher production costs, and the crea-
 tion of new market channels such as branded
 fresh produce, are low enough to allow pro-
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 ducers to make a profit.
 There is evidence that in certain regions,
 including California, markets in food safety
 and risk information are arising. Examples are
 the use of a private testing service by a super-
 market chain to certify that produce meets
 pesticide residue standards, and the growing
 market for certified organic produce. It seems
 likely that market evolution in California will
 supply what the designers of Proposition 65
 have attempted to legislate for food.
 There is a fundamental difference between
 the way Proposition 65 treats the risk from
 chemicals in drinking water and risk from
 chemicals in food or other environmental
 media. The act prohibits discharge of a listed
 chemical into drinking water but allows it in
 food as long as the buyer is warned. Like the
 warning requirement, the discharge prohibi-
 tion does not replace current regulatory pro-
 grams but creates an additional layer of
 regulation. The main differences between the
 approach of the act and other regulatory pro-
 grams to regulating water discharge is that en-
 forcement is decentralized and standards for
 reproductive toxins are set more strictly.
 It is difficult to see how the discharge regu-
 lations could result in an improvement in the
 efficiency of risk management for drinking wa-
 ter, with the possible exception of the decen-
 tralized enforcement system. Decentralized
 enforcement may prove to be more efficient
 than the current system of centralized en-
 forcement. Point source water pollution is al-
 ready closely regulated by the Water Quality
 Act, and public sources of drinking water are
 regulated by the Clean Drinking Water Act.
 The major unregulated areas are private drink-
 ing water wells and nonpoint source water pol-
 lution.
 Proposition 65 may strengthen control of
 point source pollution of private wells by giv-
 ing well owners another option in addition to
 liability suits. For nonpoint source pollution of
 private wells, however, and nonpoint source
 pollution in general, Proposition 65 has little to
 offer.
 To begin with, agriculture, a major nonpoint
 source polluter, is favored by the act and its
 regulations. The exemption for firms employ-
 ing fewer than ten employees exempts most
 small to medium size commercial farms. The
 regulations governing water discharge contain
 several exemptions that favor agriculture.
 These include an exemption for discharge of
 listed chemicals that occur naturally in the soil
 that results from unavoidable runoff of irriga-
 tion and a rebuttable presumption that pes-
 ticides used in compliance with ederal and
 state restrictio s will not enter drinking water.
 More fundamentally, setting water quality
 standards coupled with fines for non-
 compliance is not sufficient to c ntrol non-
 point source ollution. By definition, nonpoint
 source pollution arises from many sources,
 one of them readily identifiable. Even with
 the bounty hunter incentive, legal action
 against nonpoint source polluters would be
 al ost impossible. First is the obvious dif-
 ficulty in determining the source and hence
 responsibility for the discharge. Second, any
 chemical discharged prior to the time the dis-
 charge prohibition takes effect is exempted.
 B cause chemicals are not dated, it will be
 very difficult to sort out legal from illegal dis-
 charges.
 Inverting the burden of proof, however,
 does add an important element to the en-
 forcement problem. Just as it is nearly impos-
 sible to demonstrate that a chemical found in
 water was discharged from a particular non-
 point source, an accused polluter may find it
 almost impossible to prove that he or she did
 not discharge that chemical. If the courts take
 a hard line against nonpoint source polluters,
 fear of prosecution could lead to reduced use
 of listed chemicals by nonpoint sources and
 i creased demand for alternative technologies
 that do not rely on listed chemicals.
 State Regulation in a Federal System
 As we have seen, Proposition 65 and its im-
 plementing regulations employ a mix of tools
 such as warnings, prohibitions, and fines to
 manage the risk from listed toxins in the envi-
 ronment. The law also makes choices about
 the distribution of the responsibility for risk
 management among individuals and local,
 s ate, and federal government. These latter
 choices are as critical as the former in deter-
 mining the economic impact of the law.
 Any state's ability to make independent de-
 cisions about management of toxins is limited
 by the commerce and supremacy clauses of
 the Constitution. Under the commerce clause,
 state laws can be challenged in the federal
 courts if they present an undue burden on
 interstate commerce. In such cases, the court
 weighs the burden on interstate commerce
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 against the interests of the state in protecting
 its residents' health and welfare.
 Congress can, under the supremacy clause,
 use preemption to limit state regulatory ac-
 tions. The clearest case is when federal law or
 regulations expressly preempt or restrict the
 scope of state regulation. Absent explicit
 preemption, the federal courts may find that
 state regulation is implicitly preempted if con-
 gressional intent to occupy the field to the
 exclusion of the state can be inferred, if there
 are conflicts between state and federal law that
 make compliance with both difficult or impos-
 sible, or if state regulation impedes the ac-
 complishment of congressional goals (Pierce).
 Because Proposition 65 spans several areas
 that have distinct regulatory frameworks at
 the federal level, the question of whether it is
 subject, in whole or in part, to invalidation in
 the courts or preemption is complex. Much
 depends on the implementing regulations.
 Much also depends on the actual economic
 and social impacts felt in the diverse areas it
 covers.
 For industry, concern surrounds the regula-
 tory tools used, the stringency of their applica-
 tion, and the degree of conflict or complemen-
 tarity between state and federal law. Proposi-
 tion 65-type legislation poses significant
 strategic problems in manufacturing and dis-
 tribution for firms that operate across state
 and national lines. These problems are
 exacerbated if other states follow California
 by adopting similar, but not identical, re-
 quirements. For many firms and industry as-
 sociations, Proposition 65 is a key test case
 where the distribution between state and fed-
 eral government of responsibility for managing
 toxins will be decided. Given the proclivity for
 innovative state regulation in the 1980s, much
 of industry hopes to see this test end with the
 federal government reasserting its power to
 impose uniform national regulation.
 For society, the choice involves weighing
 the potential costs of state-to-state variation in
 regulation against potential welfare benefits
 gained by tailoring regulation to the prefer-
 ences of state residents. Focusing on this
 tradeoff, Foote argues that federal law gen-
 erally does and should provide a floor of
 minimum health and safety standards. States
 should be allowed to enforce stricter standards
 if those standards do not create an undue bur-
 den on interstate commerce. The concept of
 undue burden on interstate commerce places a
 ceiling on the scope of state regulation.
 The discharge provision of Proposition 65
 applies most directly to point source pollution.
 While efficiency in regulatory decision-making
 and equity arguments may be made for mini-
 mum federal regulation of such discharges,
 additional state regulations may be desirable
 where the effects of the regulation are largely
 in-state (Foote). Protection of drinking water
 i  a large state like California may be such a
 case. While the regulation may be inconve-
 nient or costly for industry and may cause
 some firms to relocate, it likely does not inter-
 fere fundamentally with interstate commerce.
 The regulations for Proposition 65 appear, in
 large part, to follow this reasoning (Ely). They
 recognize other federal and state law but also
 clearly impose additional regulation on dis-
 charges.
 The requirement to warn before exposure to
 listed chemicals is quite broad. The law recog-
 izes the supremacy of federal regulation by
 exempting exposures for which federal warn-
ing law preempts state authority. This in itself
 is not definitive because federal law often does
 not include explicit preemptive language, and
 preemptive intent must be inferred. Beyond
 this, in areas wher  state warning regulations
 are not preempted, Proposition 65 may yield
 to federal regul tion by recognizing federal
 wa nin  requirements as meeting the state's
 r quirement  or by stating that federal regula-
 tion insures that a particular exposure poses
 no significant risk for carcinogens or will have
 no observable effect for reproductive toxins.
 The regulations distinguish among three
 types of exposure: through consumer prod-
 ucts, the workplace, or the environment.
 Analysis of workplace and environmental ex-
 posure is similar to that for discharges. Work-
 place and, to a lesser extent, environmental
 exposures are site-specific with most of the
 impacts occurring in-state. State warning re-
 quirements, if not required to be attached to
 products (e.g., cleaning solvents used in
 plants), will likely have little impact on inter-
 state commerce. Thus, for these two warning
 requirements, the state's interest in providing
 a more protective environment may outweigh
 the national interest in uniform regulation. As
 with discharge prohibitions, the regulations
 recognize federal law and, where not preemp-
 ted, add further requirements for warning.
 The requirement to warn of exposure to
 listed chemicals through consumer products
 presents a different case. Foote argues that
 state information requirements that affect the
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 product package are likely to burden interstate
 commerce because they affect economies of
 scale in production and distribution. Point-
 of-purchase or other separate information
 sources are not as likely to have this effect so
 the expected burden depends, at least in part,
 on how the information is required to be deliv-
 ered.
 The current regulations for consumer prod-
 ucts eliminate a large source of possible
 conflict between federal and state law by de-
 ferring to FDA standards. The issue of federal
 preemption will resurface if and when the state
 moves to require warning labels for any of
 these products.
 No exemption exists for other consumer
 products including alcohol and tobacco. The
 use of warning notices and the toll-free hot-
 line constitute a point-of-purchase response
 which, following the prior analysis, is rela-
 tively unlikely to place an undue burden on
 interstate commerce. Should product labeling
 requirements spread to other products, a high
 degree of conflict will arise between state and
 federal law and between firms' strategic inter-
 ests and the state's desire to provide protec-
 tion.
 Conclusion
 Proposition 65 is an attempt to reform toxic
 chemical risk management in California and
 perhaps the U.S. as well. The privatization of
 decisions about use of listed chemicals and
 decentralization of enforcement constitute
 major innovations. Whether or not these inno-
 vations will also improve the efficiency of
 toxic chemical risk management, Proposition
 65 is a bold experiment in political economy
 with California as the laboratory.
 When we look at the particular policy in-
 struments chosen by Proposition 65-the warn-
 ing requirement and the discharge prohibition
 -we become less enthusiastic. Labeling
 coupled with regulation of toxins may be an
 effective combination for reducing the risks
 facing society. However, the warning label re-
 quirement of Proposition 65 is probably too
 strong given the generally low levels of risk
 covered by the act, and it fails to give consum-
 ers information about actual or relative risks.
 The discharge requirement largely duplicates
 existing water quality regulations for carcino-
 gens, though it is much more strict (too strict?)
 for reproductive risks. It also fails to improv
 regulation of the major source of water pollu-
 tion that is currently unregulated: pollution
 from nonpoint sources.
 Proposition 65 will likely increase the state's
 share of the responsibility for management of
 toxins in the environment. This added respon-
 sibility will probably be in areas where state
 regulation does not result in an undue burden
 on interstate commerce or the production and
 distribution strategies oftlational firms. Such
 regulation, however, does impose costs that
 must be weighed against health and welfare
 benefits at the state and national levels. Other
 state claims of responsibility, particularly in
 the area of consumer product labeling, may
 ultimately be repudiated by a reassertion of
 federal power in Congress or the courts. The
 political and economic challenge is to balance
 states' desires to manage toxins in a way that
 reflects residents' preferences with the ben-
 efits of a uniform national market for man-
 ufacturing and distribution.
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